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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
NICOLE H. CODE, F.K.A. NICOLE L. HANDRAHAN,

Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND
BUND,

Defendants/Respondents.

Brief of Defendants/Respondents

Statement of Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals issued its decision in this action on March 23,2006. Code
v. Utah Dep't of Health. 2006 UT App 113, 133 P.3d 438. A timely petition for certiorari
was filed by Plaintiff. This Court granted that petition, limited to one question: "Whether
the court of appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case."
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
(West 2004).

Issue Presented
Final Order
Under established precedent, a district court order is a final, appealable order if it
determines substantial rights of the parties and finally terminates the litigation, leaving
nothing more to be done. The district court's memorandum decision granted the State's
motion to dismiss and dismissed Code's claim without inviting any further action. Did
the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the memorandum decision was a final,
appealable orderfromwhich Code's time to appeal ran?

A. Standard of Review
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for
correctness. Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346,350 (Utah 1997).

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached in the Addendum to this Brief:
Utah R. Civ. P. 7

2

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a district court proceeding.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiff Nicole Code filed this wrongful termination action against Utah's

Department of Health and the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind (collectively "State").
R. 55-59. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted in a
memorandum decision entered January 10,2005. R. 69-73. The memorandum decision
did not leave anything further to be done. It was signed by the district court judge and
stated that "[f]6r the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim." R. 72.
The memorandum decision was mailed to both counsel on the day it was entered. R. 73.
On February 23,2005, Code filed with the district court a proposed order of
dismissal. R. 74-75. She had not been requested by the court to prepare any such
document. On February 25,2005, the district court signed Code's proposed order of
dismissal. R. 74-75. Code's notice of appeal was filed on March 8,2005. R. 76-78.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Code's appeal for lack ofjurisdiction, concluding
that the district court's memorandum decision was a final, appealable order and the notice
of appeal had not been filed within 30 days of that order. 2006 UT App 113,133 P.3d
3

438. Code timely filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. This Court granted the
petition, limited to the following question: "Whether the Court of Appeals lacked
appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case."

3.

Disposition Below
By a published memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction.

Summary of the Argument
The Court of Appeals correctly applied its own and this Court's precedent in
concluding that, because the district court's memorandum decision determined the
substantial rights of the parties and finally terminated the litigation, leaving nothing
further to be done, it was a final, appealable order and Code's time to appeal ran from the
entry of that order. And because the subsequent order submitted by Code did not change
the substantive rights of the parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
second order did not restart the time to appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal was untimely
because it was not filed within 30 days of the district court's memorandum decision, and
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

4

ARGUMENT
Code's notice of appeal was untimely because It was not filed
within 30 days of the district court's memorandum decision which was a final, appealable judgment that determined the
substantial rights of the parties and terminated the litigation,
leaving nothing further to be done

The Court of Appeals correctly applied its own and this Court's precedent in
determining that the district court's memorandum decision was a final, appealable order,
from which Code's time to appeal ran.
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a]n appeal may
be taken from a district... court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal
from all final orders and judgments." "[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from." Utah R.-App. P. 4(a). The district court entered its signed
memorandum decision on Monday, January 10,2005. Code's notice of appeal should
have been filed no later than Wednesday, February 9,2005. Because the notice of appeal
wasfiledlate, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
this appeal.
In deciding whether a particular order or memorandum decision is a final order,
this Court looks to the substance of the document:
A final order or judgment must dispose of the case as to all the
parties, andfinallydispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the
5

merits of the case. In other words, to be a final judgment, the order must
end the controversy between the litigants.
Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, f23,44 P.3d 663 (citations and internal
quotations omitted). See also Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State. 889 P.2d 415,417
(Utah 1994) (signed minute entry can be a final judgment where "the ruling specifies with
certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of
enforcement."); Harris v. IES Assocs.. Inc.. 2003 UT App 112,1(56, 69 P.3d 297
(acknowledging Utah Supreme Court precedent that order is final if it determines
substantial rights and finally terminates the litigation).
The district court's memorandum decision here meets the criteria for a final
judgment. It dismissed Code's claim entirely, decisively ending the controversy. It is
susceptible of enforcement. It did not leave anything more to be done,, Unlike the signed
minute entry in Swenson.1 the memorandum decision does not contain language showing
an intent that a separate, further, order be entered. Code fails to cite any language in the
memorandum decision itself which would call into question its finality.
Code failed to file her notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the
memorandum decision. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives an appellate

1

In Swenson. the signed minute entry expressly instructed the defendants' counsel
to prepare a final order. The Court ruled that such a minute entry could not be a final
order where its very wording called for a separate order to be prepared. Swenson. 889
P.2dat417.
6

court ofjurisdiction. Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. of Utah. Inc.. 2000 UT 48, f 5,
2 P.3d 447. See also Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952,955
(Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is
a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal."). The Court of Appeals
properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed.
The Court of Appeals also correctly applied its own precedent to determine that the
subsequent order of February 25th did not reset Code's time for appeal because the
second order did not alter the substantive rights decided by the memorandum decision.
See Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405,1fl8, 82 P.2d 191 ("Where a judgment is
reentered, and the subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights affected by
the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from thefirstjudgment.") (internal quotations
and citation omitted), cert denied. 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). Code does not dispute that
the second order failed to alter substantive rights decided by the memorandum decision,
only that the memorandum decision could not have constituted a final order due to a
presumption againstfinalityin Rule 7(f)(2).
But Rule 7(f)(2) contains no presumption against finality. It simply does not
address what happens when a prevailing party does not submit a further order. Faced
with a rule that did not address her situation, Code reasonably should have turned to case
law to fill in the gap. And, based on the clear definition offinalityin case law, Code
should have preserved her right to appeal byfilingher notice of appeal within 30 days of

7

the memorandum decision rather than dilatorily filing her proposed order after that time
had run.2 Instead she advances an interpretation of the rule which allows her to
circumvent her duty to file a timely notice of appeal and relieves her of her duty to review
case law. Even Judge McHugh, despite her sympathy for the confusion created by the
rule, did not dissent from the majority, but agreed that under "clear precedent" the
memorandum decision was a final order. Code atfflf11. Code fails to explain why, given
this clear precedent, she was justified in relying on the language of Rule 7(f)(2) alone.
At best, Code's argument may support an amendment of Rule 7(f)(2) to fill in this
gap, not reversal of the precedent that has filled that gap up to now. See Laney v.
Fairview Citv. 2002 UT 79, 1f 45, 57 P.3d 1007 (noting the "substantial burden of
persuasion" on a party seeking to overturn precedent in demonstrating that prior case law
"is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will
come by departing from precedent"). Precisely what form that amendment would take is
for this Court to decide, but any such amendment would not relieve Code of her
responsibility to apply precedent and timely file a notice of appeal.
Code's reliance on Rule 7(f)(2) is further misplaced because, as held by the Court
of Appeals, the clear directive from the district court in dismissing the case brought the

2

Code incorrectly asserts that such a cautionary approach would have been
ineffective and premature. But under Utah R. App. P. 4, a notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decision but before entry of judgment would have been treated as
properly filed since no tolling motions were filed in this case.
8

memorandum decision within the "unless otherwise directed" exception to Rule 7(f)(2).
Rule 7(f)(2) provides that a further order need not be submitted if "otherwise directed by
the court." After analyzing the merits of Code's claim, the district court ordered: "For the
reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim." R. 72. The unambiguous
dismissal here, without invitation to submit further order, left nothing more to be done.
By explicitly dismissing the case, the district court implicitly directed that no further order
was required.

CONCLUSION
Code has failed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals's finality analysis was
incorrect. Because the district court's memorandum decision determined the substantial
rights of the parties and finally terminated the litigation, it was a final, appealable order
under established Utah appellate case law. With entry of that final order, Code's appeal
time began to run and her notice of appeal, filed more than thirty days later, was untimely.
And because the subsequent order submitted by Code did not change the substantive

9

rights of the parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the second order did
not restart the time to appeal. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Dated this 2^

"Hay of September, 2006.

J/CLIFFOR^PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS to the following this ^ ^ 4 a y of September, 2006:
BRAD C. SMITH (6656)
BENJAMIN C. RASMUSSEN (9462)
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM

Rule 6

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Note 20
stonv. LeWis, 1901^818 P.2d 531. Appeal And
Error ^ 9 4 9
A&nittirig administrate record, 3f zoning
procedure at time of trial1 was\vithfo discretion
of trial court, absent showing that-party lacked
actual notice and time to prepare to meet questionS raised by admitted documents. Rules Cfv.
Proc., Rule 6(d). * Saricry, City \l Salt Lake 6oun-t
ty, 1990^794 V2d 4 8 ^ certiorari grafted 804
P.2d 1232, reversed in'part ?27 P.2d 2r£. Zoning And Planning fe» 643
*
Where party filed notice of appeal from decision pfjjransporta^on Commission within 30
days,, of notice of decision, such appeal was
timely even though E$jt filed within 30 days
from date on the decision. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 6(a, e)> 81(d); U.C.A.1953,
27-12-13^9. Reagan putdoor Advertising, Inq.
v. UtahJDept. of Transp., 1979, 589 P.2d 782.
Highways «» 95.1
filed
Plaintiffs cause was not prejudiced by twoday notice of hearingifor release jog attached
property, where claimed, prejudice j#» plaintiff
did not involve inadequacy of time^to»prepare
for. hearing but njerejy reflected concern over
consequences of releasing attached property.
Rules ^f Civil Procedure, rules 6(d), 64C(f),
Jensen v. Eames, 1974, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519
P.2d23£. Appeal And Error @=> 1043(3)
That defendants' counsel entered case about
date that notice of appeal was filed and desired
to i read transcript before filing designation of
record <m appeal was not excusable neglect
justifying allowing of appeal after he failed to
timely file designation where'he was available
to request additional time to serve designation
but failed, to do so. Rules' of Civil Procedure,

rules*6(b), 73(a), 75(a)? Nti&ley v. Stati'Katz
Real Estate, Inc., 1964; 15 Utah -2d 126, 388
P/2d798. Appeal And Frrt& $=* 607(2)
'" Attorney filing ^notice trf appeal is charg&&
with knowledge of when{ cfe&Hgnation!, of recofii
ori^ appeal should be filed and if during period
before filing time, he is ^aware of reason for
delay, lie is not entitTe4 to_ ignore "lime,, period
and later claim excusable nieglect without filing
for extension of time. Rules of Civil JProcqdure>
rules 6(b), 73(a), 75(a). Nunley, y rK Stan Katz
Real Estate, Inc.,, i964, 15 Ut^£4Vl£*» 38£
P.2d>79$. Appeal And Error <&> 607(2)
Where petition was denied by formal findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order dated and
filed February 23, and notice of appeal was not
presented to clerk of district court for' filing
until; March 24^althouigh served on opponent's
counsel on March 23, > notice was-not timely
and* appeal was dismissed. Rules of'Civil
Procedure, rules 6(b), 58A(c) 60(bMsl), 73(a)*
Andersons. Anderson, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282
P-2d 845.' Time <&=> 5; Appeal And Error ^ »
428(2)
Rule rjrovidin^ that time within which" an
appeal may be taker/ mayfa»Extended on showmg of excusable1'neglect based on failure of a
party to learn of entry of judgment prescribes
only circumstance under which court mayextend time for filing notice*of appeal; and other
rules granting <i>ower to extend time for failure
to act if due to excusable neglect apply only
where Notice "of appeal has been fileTd in time,
Rules of Civil Procedure/ rule's -6(b), 58A(c),
60(b), <l)f 73(a) Anderson v/Anderson, 1955,3
Utah 2d277, 282 P.2d 845. Appeal' And Error
&=> 430(2)

PART III. ?£EADINGS, MOTIONS; ANlD ORDERS
R U L E 7.

PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS* MEMORANDA, HEAR
INGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDEijL
(a) Pleading^. There shall be a complaint and; an answer* a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer tb a cross d&im^if Ihe answer" contains a cross claim';
a third party complaint, if a person who \y£S not an original party is s u m m o n ^
under th€ provisions of Rule 14; and a third party, answer,, if a third party
cqmplaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that'the court
may or4er a reply to an answer or a third p^rty answer.
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall7 bVb^ motion
which, uniess made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court'
comjnfesioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motiow^shall b8
in* writftig and state succinctly 2nd with particularity the relief sought ^nd 5 the
grounds for the relief sought.
(c) Memoranda.

56

RJIEADiNGSj MOTIONS, & ORDERS

Rufet3

(cXlX Mpmofsmda?required[> exception!*, filing timfa All jpotio;ns,> except imGpnt£sted,Q$ ex parte nlofions^sbalLbe a&CompapiecLby a supportingjm^motaQr
dumio Within„teji days after service of the motion jind supporting 'mentfftjBO*
d u m ^ a ' p a ^ opposing the^'jnotjon shall Bte a memorandum^ in opposition,
Withpa five^days after s^rvibe^f $hk memorandum in oppositions jh^moying
party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited tfagebitftfll- of
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will
be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to
fts' mitial'niemorahdtf m.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exqeed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court Reply memoranda'stjall hot exceed. 5^ pages of
argument without leave of the .court. The coun may permit a party to file an
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good
cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) .A memorandum ^tippontmg a motionft>j?summary, judgment shaft
coiitain a statement of material fectsas to which} the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists Each fafct shall be separately stated and numbered apd
supposed bjj citation tQ^relevajiJ materials such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Eacft faet s#t fcftfe in the movjftg party's .memorandum 'is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party
(c)(3)(B)* A* memorandum opposing a motion.fprt summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving parley's, facts4 that is
controverted, and may ,cqptain a separate statement of additional, facis in
dispute. For eacji ot!the moving party's facts that is controverted^ the opposjhjg
party shall provide an explanation Qf th^ grounds for any dispute, supporteVTBy
citation^ tp relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery matepals, For
any additional facts set forth in tKe opposing memorandum, eaqK fact shall 1>e
separately stated {and numbered and supportea by citation to supporting materials'! such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities wi$Kj>age references.
<c)(3)(D) A party'may *attac$f*as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits br discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing, is complete* either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date oirwhifcH ihi fnotiBh^&s'&rved?*tfie date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the datfe the repty memorandum/ if any, wits
served, and whether a hearing has been requested, t l i n o parrg Jil^k a.requfe&t
the motion will not be submitted for decision
(e) Hearings. The court may^hold'a'hearmg on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, inra memorandum or in the request to submit
57

Rufc?

R15LES CBP CIVIL P R O C E D U R E

for-decisftiii. A request f o r b e a r i n g shall be'separately identified in t h e caption
of the dodumerit containing the request. The fcourtf'shall grant & rgenifcstfcra
h i r i n g oft; a motfbn u n d e r Rule 56 v ok a motioff that w o u l d dispdsfe of r th&
action or*any claifti o r defense in the actioitf'uftless*the court fiftds t h a t ' t h e
motion or opposition tb t h e m o t i o n i s fnvolousor^the i s s u e h a s b e k n authoritatively decided:
(t) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of t h e court, including £ m i n u t e order
entered in writing, n o t included in a judgment. An order fpr the p a y m e n t of
m o n e y m a y b e enforced in the s a m e ihahner asj f it "were a judgment. Exqept
as otherwise provided b y these rules, any order rnadfe without notice to*the
adverse party m a y b e vacated or m o d i f i e d by the j u d g e w h o made* i t w i t h o r
without notice. Orders shall state w h e t h e r they are entered u p o n trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with a n initial
m e m o r a n d u m , or unless otherwise directed b y thfe'Court* the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision^ serve u p o n the other parties
a proposed order i n conformity with the court's decision. Objections td t h e
proposed order shall b e filed within five days'^aftep serviced The p d r t y preparing the order shall file the proposed order u p o n being served with a n objection
or upon expiration of the tiing t o object.
(0(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall'bS prepared"3s
separate d o c u m e n t s a n d shall not incorporate any m^ttfer by ffeference.
(g) Objection "to court commissioner's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . A r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
of a court c o m m i s s i o n e r is the order of the court until modified by tiie court. lA
party may^ obfect f o the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n /by filing ,an objection i n the" 'same
manrier'as filing^ ftiotion within t e n days after the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is m a 4 e m
open court or^ if the court c o m m i s s i o n e r takes the 'matter uricjer advisement,
ten "days after the minute entry df t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is'served. A party m a y
r e s p o n d to the objection in the s a m e m a i m e r afc resooriding t o a motion.
[Amended effective November U 2 0 0 3 ; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005.]
Advisory Committee Note
Jh;e;pracitice. for courtesy copies varies ments and,(;i£sp, when and whereto delivby judge" and f so is not regulajed g r i l l e , er tljejm.
Each party should ascertain whether the
P a r a g r a p h (f) a p p l i e s t o a l I o r d e r s
Qtft
judge wants a courtesy copy of that party s
. ^ ^
ordere
r
motion, memoranda'and supporting docu-« J
.Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Learning professionalism aijdt civilityThoughts ^for new, members ot *the rbar. Judge
Derek P. Julian ; lS-AtJG iftah'BJ. 32 .(2005)*

Jii<fgmeni <S=>183.
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